This article considers the recent introduction of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 in New Zealand, and compares it with the established processes of civil asset recovery in Ireland, England and Wales. Salient differences between the models are examined, including the more expansive definitions in Ireland. The paper posits that the recovery process in these three jurisdictions in fact is a criminal one which merits the adoption of due process rights, given the promotion of the aims of punishment, the centrality of the targeted individual's culpability, and the powers of the agencies involved. However, the extant jurisprudence in Ireland and England has concluded that the process is civil: thus, perhaps the best that can be expected is the adoption of a "middle ground" approach, which encompasses protective rights while still operating in the civil sphere.
Introduction
Civil asset recovery has been used as a key mechanism to tackle organised and gangland criminality in Ireland, England and Wales for the past decade, and this tactic has recently been adopted in the New Zealand by means of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. The accrual of considerable wealth by criminals, coupled with the perceived inability of the existing legal framework to deal with this state of affairs, precipitated legislative action in this regard. While measures facilitating the confiscation of a convicted offender's property were already in place in each of these jurisdictions, 1 delegating responsibility for the implementation of illegal acts, thereby preventing prosecution in the conventional way. Also, the methods of perpetrating crime and of communicating by the "overlords" and "godfathers" of organised crime are seen as more advanced and impenetrable to law enforcement agencies. 5 In the words of David Garland, the state is thus faced with a "criminological predicament" in which high crime rates are a normal social fact and the criminal justice process is ineffective, and so the state adapts to the "new reality" of crime control by employing measures such as civil forfeiture. 6 This insulation of leaders of organised crime gangs from prosecution and their use of sophisticated tactics and means of communication was seen to warrant the adoption of a "radically new and thorough approach" which requires evidence only on the civil burden of proof. 7 In the Irish Parliament it was stated that "[i]f traditional methods fail we must devise new ones.…. If we cannot arrest the criminals, why not confiscate their assets?" 8 Similarly, the Attorney General in England and Wales stated that civil recovery "is needed to fill an important gap in the law", 9 while in the New Zealand Parliament it was claimed that the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 "is not working, so it is necessary to repeal it", 10 and that there was a need to be "a lot more creative as law drafters". 11 Such remarks encapsulate the rationale underpinning this adaptive response to the problem of organised crime. As the conventional means of criminal prosecution were deemed to be lacking, a new mechanism was devised which eases the burden on the state and facilitates the control of such criminality in a novel way, by pursuing the funds of gang leaders and so stifling future criminality; by removing negative role models; and by generating confidence in a fair and effective criminal justice system.
The Irish exemplar
In Ireland, support for civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crime was expressed as far back as 1985 by the Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System and the Select Committee on
Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism. 13 Nevertheless, little further consultation or analysis was undertaken before the remarkably speedy introduction of legislation in the summer of 1996. 14 The Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, which was proposed by Fianna Fáil (the main opposition party at the time) as a private member's bill, was enacted within a mere five weeks. This action was prompted by the murders of police officer Jerry McCabe and investigative journalist Veronica Guerin in quick succession, expediting the enactment of two seminal statutes pertaining to civil asset recovery. 15 As one member of Parliament Act allowed the Minister for Justice to freeze monies held by a bank which he believed to be the property of an unlawful organisation 23 and require them to be paid to the High Court, and this action was not dependent on the initiation of criminal proceedings. After a period of six months, the Minister could make an ex parte application to the High Court directing that the monies be paid to him, but any person claiming to be the owner of the property could also apply to have the monies paid to him, bearing the burden of proof to establish ownership. 24 The 1985 Act was limited in its lifespan, as it was brought in on a temporary basis and operated for a mere three months unless continued in force by Government order, and was used in only one instance.
The subject of the order challenged the constitutionality of this scheme in Clancy v Ireland, 25 where in a brief judgment, Barrington J concluded that the process amounted 19 Traditionally, the value of an inanimate object which directly or indirectly caused the accidental death of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown; forfeiture resulted after conviction for felonies and treason; and admiralty forfeiture occurred after breach of maritime or customs law. For an examination of the history of asset forfeiture see Cecil Greek, "Drug Control and In New Zealand, civil orders under the 2009 Act may be subdivided into restraint and forfeiture orders. Crucially, and in contrast to Ireland, restraint of property is not necessary before forfeiture. 45 A restraining order may be made (with or without notice to the respondent 46 ) in relation to "tainted" property acquired as a result of or derived from significant criminal activity, requiring that it is not to be disposed of, or dealt with, other than is provided for in the order. 47 Such an order lasts for one year, or until the making or declining of a forfeiture order, whichever is earlier. 
Challenges to civil forfeiture
The location of asset forfeiture in the civil realm, with the attendant lower standard of proof and a marked absence of protective rights for the individual, has prompted challenges on essentially two main grounds: that forfeiture infringes the right to private property, and that it is a criminal process which merely purports to be civil in nature. In concluding that it is not a criminal process or punishment, courts portray asset forfeiture as an in rem, rather than in personam, action:
It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.
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Moreover, the Irish and English courts cite numerous "indicia" of crimes in rejecting the argument that asset forfeiture is criminal in nature: crimes are "offences against the community at large" which attract a punitive sanction and which require mens rea; they involve detention, search, charge, bail and the possible imposition of a pecuniary penalty with liability to imprisonment if the penalty is not paid. 58 Criminal proceedings "involve a formal accusation made on behalf of the state or by a private prosecutor that a defendant has committed a breach of the criminal law, and the state or the private prosecutor has instituted proceedings which may culminate in the conviction and condemnation of the defendant". 59 Applying these criteria, forfeiture procedures were deemed not to have "the features of a criminal prosecution". 60 Thus, the courts have held, using somewhat circular logic, that a procedure is not a criminal process if it does not involve characteristics such as arrest or detention. However, it appears that it is the avoidance of these aspects at the stage of enactment which facilitates the depiction of forfeiture as civil. For example, while the lack of detention under the Proceeds of Crime Acts may be cited as evidence that the proceedings are not criminal, the initial classification of the process as civil in nature by the legislature has resulted in the fact that an individual may not be detained. Reliance was also placed on the civil categorisation of forfeiture in circumstances such as tax evasion. In Ireland, proceedings for the forfeiture of goods which had been illegally exported from the state were not seen to constitute a criminal procedure which required the safeguards of due process, despite the need to establish that an individual committed a criminal offence before forfeiture. 61 Similarly, the penalty for failure to make tax returns was found to be a deterrent or incentive and not a criminal sanction, because, besides the provision of a penalty, none of the characteristics of a criminal offence were present. 62 And in the English domestic setting, proceedings concerning the evasion of import duty were not deemed criminal because the usual consequences of a criminal conviction did not flow from them: there was no conviction or finding of guilt;
the person condemned was not treated as having a conviction, and he was not subject to any other penalty. 63 This approach was followed subsequently, despite the acknowledged severity of the repercussions for the individual in question. 64 This jurisprudence is also sanction by another name which should therefore attract due process rights: namely, the centrality of culpability, the promotion of the traditional objectives of punishment, and the immense power of the relevant agencies.
Centrality of culpability
The courts in Ireland and England have viewed the absence of a mens rea requirement, amongst other factors, as indicating that forfeiture is civil in nature, as the focus purports to be on the property rather than the person. However, as Joel Bishop observed in 1858,
[D]isguise the matter as we may, under whatever form of words, if the intent which the owner of the property carries in his bosom is the gist of the thing on which the forfeiture turns, then the question is one of the criminal law, and forfeiture is a penalty imposed for crime.
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Given that allegedly criminal behaviour is at the core of forfeiture, the intention of the individual seems pivotal. Evidence that the assets were accrued as a result of criminal activity or conduct is required before an order is made, and although the court does not need to establish to the criminal standard of proof that the respondent is responsible for criminal behaviour or for a specific offence, the blameworthiness of the respondent remains fundamental to the forfeiture of assets in what is essentially an "indirect finding of guilt".
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The presence of what is described in US jurisprudence as an "innocent owner" defence may substantiate this contention. 69 In Ireland, orders under sections 3 and 4 of prior to it being taken from the owner. 73 This suggests that the focus of the order is not the property, but rather the allegedly culpable individual, thereby refuting the contention that the orders are in rem. In other words, guilt appears to be an issue in the context of forfeiture, given that individuals who are perceived to be innocent are treated differently to those suspected to be guilty. Indeed, a comment of the Attorney General betrays this sentiment:
If, in a criminal trial, the prosecution cannot prove that the person before the court is in fact guilty … then he is entitled to be acquitted. Yet it is as plain as a pikestaff that his money has been acquired as the proceeds of crime.
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Section 66 of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 requires the High Court to make an order for relief from civil forfeiture order where the person has proven on the balance of probabilities that she has an interest in the property and has not unlawfully benefited from the relevant significant criminal activity. Moreover, property may be excluded from a forfeiture order because of undue hardship, and the decision is taken on 70 As originally enacted, section 4 of Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 allowed for the making of a disposal order where an interlocutory order had been in force for not less than seven years; now, disposal may occur after a shorter period when an application is made with the consent of the parties (section 4A, as inserted various grounds including the nature and extent of the respondent's interest in the property; and the circumstances of the significant criminal activity to which the order relates. 75 So, while mens rea need not be established as occurs in convention criminal trials, the focus on the allegedly criminal behaviour and on the culpability of the individual results in a de facto finding of guilt, suggesting that the process serves the purposes of the criminal law.
Promotion of the Aims of Punishment
Civil forfeiture promotes punishment's traditional aims of condemnation, retribution and deterrence, and so should be viewed as a criminal process. In opposition to this claim, it may be argued that the legislation merely seeks to redress an imbalance by seizing assets accrued as a result of criminal activity, and therefore is regulatory in nature. As
McGuinness J observed in the Irish High Court in Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau, the removal of the proceeds of crime "could well be viewed in the light of reparation rather than punishment or penalty." 76 Civil forfeiture may also be defended on the basis that it is analogous to a civil suit for the return of illegally obtained property. In the same way that a civil action for misappropriation of property seeks to restore the injured party to the position he was in prior to the commission of the tort, it is arguable that civil forfeiture also seeks to return the state of affairs to that before the alleged criminal offence.
However, this reparative argument is rebutted by the fact that the acting party in this instance is the state, with its vast resources and agents, characteristics which necessitate counterbalancing due process rights in the criminal context. Various safeguards are granted to the accused throughout investigation and at the pre-trial stage of criminal process "as a compensation for the unequal start in producing cases". 77 Given that "the virtually limitless resources of government investigators" 78 are also available to the state in the context of asset forfeiture, the same due process rights should accrue to the individual on the basis that the process is not merely regulatory in character. In which is attributable to the recoverable property represents the property obtained through unlawful conduct. This somewhat circular definition implies that the recoverable section of mixed property may be separated and thereafter thus recovered. 85 In contrast, no mention is made of "mixed" property in the Irish legislation, and it seems likely that mixing of funds would not necessarily preclude the granting of an order, unless it would cause a serious risk of injustice. . 98 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, section 8(7). 99 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, section 8(5).
to gather information at a local level and indicate possible foci for the Bureau's work. 102 This illustrates the unmistakeable connections between the police and CAB in Ireland and undermines the contention that the process serves merely civil aims.
The objectives of CAB are the identification of assets, wherever situated, which derive or are suspected to derive from criminal activity; the taking of action to deprive persons of such assets; and the carrying out of investigations in relation to such proceedings. 103 CAB has "not inconsiderable powers of investigation" 104 and may initiate investigations and other actions on its own motion, without need for external referral or recommendation. 105 A bureau officer who is a member of police not below the rank of superintendent may issue search warrants in circumstances of urgency, and production orders may be granted to make material available to members of CAB. given the low levels of assets recovered by ARA, its inability to meet self-financing targets and "basic failures" in management practice. 109 Moreover, ARA required a referral from a relevant police agency before acting in relation to proceeds of crime, in contrast to CAB. ARA's Director was obliged to exercise his functions "in the way which he considers is best calculated to contribute to the reduction of crime", 110 Director supported this feature on the basis that it safeguarded the requirement that the agency be satisfied about "why criminal conviction has not been possible or feasible", 114 it undoubtedly lessened its effectiveness, thereby contributing, at least in part, to its demise.
ARA was abolished by the Serious Crime Act 2007, and its civil recovery and other functions transferred to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 115 Although SOCA has been described as "an immensely powerful statutory body" 116 it remains dependent on external referral before initiating investigation or proceedings relating to asset recovery, and this characteristic differentiates it from its Irish equivalent. However, once SOCA receives such information it possesses similar powers to CAB concerning production order applications 117 and the disclosure of information. 118 Furthermore, interim orders allow for the appointment of an interim receiver with "very wide powers" 119 including search and seizure, the production of information, and taking appropriate steps to secure the preservation of the property. An examination order may be made which requires attendance before the Commissioner and production of documents. This approach is more cognisant of the dangers inherent in CAB or police officers issuing warrants themselves. CAB, SOCA and the New Zealand police force possess considerable powers concerning the entry of premises, the production of property and the investigation of suspected possession of "criminal" assets,
implying that due process rights should accrue to the targeted individual. Indeed, the ability of CAB to initiate proceedings independently, its issuance of its own warrants, and the linkage with the police force in Ireland and New Zealand add further weight to this contention.
A Middle Ground Compromise?
The proposition that certain characteristics of asset forfeiture render it criminal in nature has not convinced the courts in any jurisdiction. A markedly consequentialist thinking permeates judicial and political debate on the issue, which stresses the substantial detriment to forfeiture proceedings if due process norms were held to apply. 122 Any criticism of the process is cited as evidence of an "ulterior motive", as being "soft on crime", and as "more interested in the civil liberties of drug dealers and criminals than in helping the Government to defend communities". 123 So, given that the extant jurisprudence and political discourse demonstrates due process norms will not accrue to respondents in such circumstances, perhaps the best that can be hoped is for an intermediate approach.
The adoption of such a methodology could take the form of maintaining the process in the civil courts but requiring a higher standard of proof than the balance of probabilities; such "middle ground" jurisprudence has been identified in the US. should not place a gloss upon it, so as to require that the standard approaches that appropriate in a criminal case.
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This rejection of counsel's argument demonstrates a noteworthy degree of deference to the legislature in a situation with such repercussions for individual rights, 128 and results in an unambiguous dismissal of a "middleground" compromise.
Conclusion
Civil forfeiture allows the might of the state and the opprobrium of the community to be visited upon individuals who are believed to transgress the criminal law but who have otherwise evaded prosecution, thereby using a civil mechanism to serve the ends of the criminal process. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that asset forfeiture will be dislodged from 
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A facet of the English model which stimulates the vigorous pursuit of civil asset recovery and may explain its popularity is "incentivisation", drawing on the considerable revenue-producing capacity of asset recovery. The "Recovered Assets Incentivisation
Fund" distributes half of the assets recovered to the agencies involved to improve asset recovery and local crime fighting priorities, 131 and in 2007 police forces received £17m from the recoveries made. 132 Furthermore, assets recovered in England and Wales are allocated to community projects administered by the Home Office. 133 In addition, ARA was given detailed targets regarding recovery and a comprehensive business plan, 134 profits through asset recovery. 135 These factors may betray the underlying rationales for the process, and the imposition of fiscal targets poses a challenge to the administration of justice, as it focuses on the revenue-producing capacity of forfeiture to the potential detriment of equity or fairness. 136 The Irish Parliament may make monies available for the purpose of expenditure by the Bureau in the performance of its functions, but this funding is not dependent on the revenue confiscated or forfeited by CAB, nor does it represent a proportion of the property seized. 137 As regards the use of recovered assets, the Select Committee recommended in 1985 that the agency established to examine and trace assets of suspected drug dealers (which took the form of CAB) should eventually be funded from the proceeds of confiscation orders. 138 The "ring-fencing" of assets "for those communities who have suffered most at the hands of the drug barons" was also mooted when 
